We examine the relative prices of sibling American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). These ADRs are issued against classes of shares with different voting rights that are issued by the same foreign firm. Though superior and inferior voting siblings begin trading in the U.S. at nearly equal values, prices quickly separate. For non-Mexican issues, superior voting ADRs command a premium. For Mexican issues, superior voting shares trade at a discount. The Mexican discount is inconsistent with the benefits of U.S. listing discussed in other recent studies and cannot be explained by differences in cash flow rights, systematic risk, liquidity, voting control of major blockholders, or ownership restrictions. Our analysis suggests, however, that control for our Mexican firms has shifted to creditors and competitors, thus, eroding equity voting premiums.
are not the only holders of superior voting shares (ADRs), and incentives for outsiders to hold superior voting shares that sell at a discount are unclear.
Because the U.S. listing hypothesis fails to explain our findings, we investigate several other potential explanations for the discounts among Mexican sibling ADRs. Specifically, we examine differences in cash flow rights, systematic risk, liquidity, voting control of major block holders, and other voting and ownership restrictions. We also examine the possibility (due to the economic tension in Mexico over our sample period) that control in our sample shifted from equity holders to debt holders and competitors. This latter hypothesis and differences in liquidity are most consistent with our data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses our sample selection and describes differences in voting rights for holders of Mexican and non-Mexican sibling ADRs. Section III compares the control premium for Mexican sibling ADRs to four benchmarks that include non-Mexican sibling ADRs, dual-class shares issued by U.S. firms, home-market shares that underlie the Mexican sibling ADRs, and home-market shares of Mexican firms in Nenova's (2003) sample. The purpose of these comparisons is to determine the validity of the U.S. listing hypothesis. Section IV examines other potential reasons for the discounts Mexican superior voting sibling ADRs experience, and Section V concludes.
II. Differences in Voting Rights for Holders of Sibling ADRs
The 1998 daily returns tape of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) lists 587 ADRs (share codes 30, 31, 32, and 39) that trade on the NYSE, AMEX, or OTC. The 587 ADRs were issued by 545 separate foreign firms. Twenty-eight firms issued two ADRs; two issued three ADRs; two issued four ADRs; and one issued five ADRs. Besides issuing multiple ADRs, our sample firms meet two additional criteria. First, each ADR has volume data for at least 100 days after it begins trading in the U.S. Second, the ADRs are issued against shares with clearly differentiable voting rights, as indicated in the 20-F forms filed with the SEC. We collect and review these forms using Lexis-Nexis. Table 1 lists the 20 sibling ADRs (10 sibling pairs) issued by the 10 firms that survive our sample screens.2 Mexican firms represent half the sample. The other five firms (sibling pairs) come from Chile (1), Italy (1), Norway (1), and Sweden (2). In parentheses under the country names are shareholder protection scores assigned by LLSV (1998). Mexico (1) has the lowest score. Chile (5) has the highest. Low scores indicate weak protection.
The third column in Table 1 lists the shares that back the ADRs, with the superior voting shares listed first. The fourth column lists the dates the ADRs begin and end trading in U.S. markets through 1998. We ignore prices and volume on dates not common to both ADRs. The last three columns list the U.S. depositary 2We eliminate only one Mexican firm from the sample. That firm is Transportacion Maritima Mexicana whose A and L ADRs both trade on the NYSE. However, the A ADR is a CPO (Certificado De Participation Ordinario) which is an A ADR with voting rights stripped. The ADR and homemarket relative prices of the A and L securities for Transportacion Maritima Mexicana are consistent with the prices for the firms we retain in the sample. However, we eliminate this firm because the distinction between a CPO ADR with no voting rights and an L ADR with limited rights is less clear than the distinction between sibling ADRs with full vs. limited voting rights. 
III. Control Premiums for Mexican Sibling ADRs vs. Other Benchmarks
Besides describing voting rights for sibling ADRs, Table 2 Despite those differences, the data in Table 3 permit several inferences. Most important of these is the observation that control premiums are very similar for sibling ADRs and home-market shares. Grupo lusacell, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, and Grupo Sidek have large discounts in both the U.S. and Mexico. Telefonos de Mexico has a small discount in the U.S. and neither a discount nor a premium in Mexico. Consorcio G Grupo Dina has a large premium in both markets. These similarities are not surprising if cross-market arbitrage is possible, as Miller (1999) suggests.
For most firms in Table 3 , the ADRs trade much more frequently than the underlying shares. For example, Grupo lusacell's ADRs and home-market shares are in the sample roughly the same number of days (1150 vs. 1187), but its superior (inferior) voting ADRs trade more than four (three) times more frequently than its superior (inferior) voting home-market shares-998 vs. 210 (1150 vs. 360). Though trades occur more frequently in the U.S. than in Mexico, the volume appears larger in the home market. To illustrate, the average daily volume for Grupo lusacell's superior (inferior) voting sibling in the U.S. in Table 3 is 15,000 (48,000). Its conditional mean volume for the home-market superior (inferior) voting sibling is 1,425,000 (309,000). However, Table 1 shows that each A (L) ADR for Grupo lusacell represents 10 A (L) shares in the home market. To make volume comparisons consistent across markets, we multiply the number of homemarket shares represented by each ADR by 10. After this adjustment for Grupo Iusacell and corresponding adjustments for the other Mexican ADRs, the number 4LMM (1983) report that superior voting common shares of four firms in their sample with voting preferred stock outstanding sell at small discounts relative to inferior voting common shares. These discounts are consistent with the hypothesis that voting premiums are eroded when control is shared. We investigate this hypothesis in greater detail in Section IV. Figure  1 shows that the average control premium for Nenova's sample (18.9%) in 1997 is significantly greater than the control premium for our sample (-6.4%) during that period (t = 24.54). Since only one firm in Nenova's sample is listed in the U.S., the difference in control premiums between her sample and ours is consistent with the U.S. listing hypothesis. However, the firm that is in both samples (Consorcio G Grupo Dina) has a 38% premium in Table 2 . Hence, U.S. listing by itself does not eliminate large price disparities between sibling ADRs. 
IV. Other Potential Explanations for Relative Prices of Mexican Sibling ADRs
Given the limitations of the U.S. listing hypothesis in our sample, we now consider other possible explanations for the discounts documented in Section III. These explanations include differences in cash flow rights, risk, liquidity, voting control, and ownership restrictions. We also consider possible shifts in control from equity holders to debt holders due to the economic climate in Mexico during our sample period.
A. Differences in Cash Flow Rights
Traditional models express security prices as the present value of cash flows expected to accrue to security holders. As to dividends, the 20-F forms for our sample either remain silent or state explicitly that no differences exist in the rights of superior and inferior voting shares. The CRSP tapes also indicate that dividends paid over the sample period are equal for our siblings. In fact, only Consorcio G Grupo Dina ($0.14 for both siblings) and Telefonos de Mexico ($7.67 for both siblings) paid any dividends at all during the sample period. 5 Interestingly, the other firms-Grupo lusacell, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, and Grupo Sidek-are firms whose superior voting ADRs sell at large discounts in Table 2 
B. Differences in Risk
Even with equal cash flow rights, sibling ADRs could have different prices if inside shareholders shift risk to holders of inferior voting shares. The discounts in Table 2 voting ADRs. That inside shareholders would voluntarily assume greater risk than outside shareholders when they have equal cash flow rights seems implausible. Nevertheless, for completeness' sake, we examine how risk differences impact relative prices in our sample.
We examine differences in risk with two sets of seemingly unrelated regressions. The first set tests cross-equation differences in concurrent and lagged U.S. and home-market betas estimated in the spirit of Scholes and Williams (1977) . The second set estimates only concurrent betas for the U.S. and Mexican markets. Data for the home-market indexes and for exchange rates that convert those indexes to U.S. dollars come from Bloomberg. In the regressions with both concurrent and lagged betas, only Grupo Sidek and Telefonos de Mexico have betas that unambiguously support the hypothesis that market risk explains the relative prices in Table 2 . In the second set of regressions, only Grupo Sidek's betas are consistent with that hypothesis. Thus, as expected, differences in risk offer at best a partial explanation of our findings. Table 4 test the equality of mean daily turnover and mean daily spreads for each sibling pair. Double (single) asterisks denote significant differences at the 5% (10%) level. Turnover data come from the CRSP tapes. Spread data come from the consolidated quotes files of the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
C. Differences in Liquidity LMM (1984) and Smith and Amoako-Adu (1995) note that inferior voting shares trade more frequently than their superior voting counterparts. If trade is more costly for shares that trade less frequently, the discounts for Mexican superior voting ADRs may be reasonable. Table 4 summarizes data on the frequency of trade and relative trading volume from Table 2 and on daily turnover and daily spreads (closing ask prices-closing bid prices). The t-statistics in
For all firms except Consorcio G Grupo Dina, inferior voting ADRs trade at least as frequently as their superior voting siblings. For Consorcio G Grupo Dina, inferior voting shares trade less frequently. Because Consorcio G Grupo Dina is the only Mexican firm whose superior voting ADRs trade at a premium in Table  2 , these data suggest that liquidity partially explains relative prices in our sample. That evidence is only suggestive, however, because Table 4 also indicates that the superior voting ADRs that trade at discounts still trade relatively often. The median fraction of days traded for these ADRs compared with their inferior voting siblings is approximately 0.95. Thus, potential mispricings cannot be justified based on infrequent trading.
Of course, not all trades are equally informative or equally costly. Therefore, turnover and spread data are also important. In every case for which Mexican superior voting ADRs sell at discounts, superior voting ADRs have lower mean turnover than their inferior voting siblings. Mean spreads are also higher (at least at the 0.10 level) for three of these superior voting ADRs. For Consorcio G Grupo Dina, mean turnover is higher and the mean spread is lower for the superior voting sibling. These findings provide stronger evidence that differences in liquidity partially explain the relative prices of Mexican sibling ADRs. The low correlations between the sibling pairs for turnover and spread data suggest, however, that 
much of the motivation for investors to trade and for market makers to set spreads is idiosyncratic to individual siblings.
To examine the time-series relations between relative prices and relative liquidity, we run vector autoregressions for each sibling pair. These regressions test the marginal significance of lagged (t = -1 to -5 ) relative liquidity in predicting current relative prices, after controlling for the lagged (t = -1 to -5) influence of relative prices. The regressions then also test the ability of lagged relative prices to predict current relative liquidity, after accounting for the lagged influence of relative liquidity. We use three different measures of relative liquidity from Table 4 in these regressions: i) relative volume; ii) differences in turnover; and iii) the ratio of the spreads of the superior to the inferior voting ADRs. 6 For brevity, we do not report results in a separate table. However, in general, neither lagged relative prices nor lagged relative liquidity predicts the other variable after accounting for the lagged influence of the variable to be predicted.
One exception to the above generalization is for Telefonos de Mexico. When we use relative volume as our definition of relative liquidity, that firm has a significant F-statistic (5.85, p-value < 0.05) on the combined coefficients for relative prices when relative liquidity is the dependent variable and on the combined coefficients for relative liquidity when the relative price is the dependent variable (F = 6.46, p-value < 0.05). This finding suggests that lagged relative prices impact relative liquidity and vice versa for this firm. However, scaled impulse response functions for Telefonos de Mexico show that current shocks to relative 6Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) examine another potential source of liquidity, i.e., ADR splits that are not accompanied by splits in the home market. The CRSP relative cumulative split factors for the ADRs in our sample are the same across the sample period. Therefore, even if splits enhance liquidity relative to the home-market shares, ADR splits do not change liquidity for one sibling vis-hvis the other in our sample. prices have virtually no impact on subsequent relative volume, and that current shocks to current relative volume have little influence on future relative prices. Despite the significant F-statistics from the vector autoregressions, therefore, we find little time-series evidence to support the hypothesis that differences in liquidity help explain the relative prices of our sibling ADRs. Zingales (1994) argues that private benefits of control account for much of the large mean market value premium (over 80%) Italian voting shares enjoy. Specifically, he asserts (p. 126) that "votes held by small outside shareholders become very valuable when they are pivotal, that is, when they are decisive in attributing control to any of the management teams fighting for it." We now examine whether this argument applies to our ADR sample. Table 5 reports ownership structures for our Mexican firms. Some firms have shares outstanding that do not have ADRs issued against them. Therefore, superior voting rights may be shared by more than two classes of equity. Table  5 shows ownership for all classes of equity for which data are available from the 20-F forms. NA indicates that data are not available for a particular class. As stated above, ADRs have the same voting rights as the shares that back them. For small block investors to enjoy the position to which Zingales alludes, at least two groups must vie for control. Therefore, we divide the sample into ownership by officers and directors as a group and by large external blockholders. We assume that officers and directors vote their shares as a block as suggested by LLSV (1998), (2000) but that outside blockholders' opinions may diverge from directors' opinions. We assume further that outside blockholders' preferences may differ with each other. Therefore, we also report (in parentheses) the number of different shareholders that account for the outside blockholdings.
D. Differences in Voting Control and Ownership Restrictions
For outside investors to wield an influence, they must own enough shares so that, when combined with a block, they create a majority for one voting block or the other. Table 5 shows that small shareholders have limited ability to tilt a vote in this manner. Only two firms-Telefonos de Mexico and Grupo lusacellshow significant internal and external voting blocks. Even for these firms, the opportunity for small shareholders to wield an influence is remote. The large external block (25%) in Grupo lusacell is roughly only one-third the size of the block held by officers and directors (72%). The large inside block of AA shares in Telefonos de Mexico (40%) is smaller than the majority position of the three external blockholders of AA shares (51%). Thus, ownership structures cannot explain relative prices in our sample.
Our next attempt to explain differences in relative prices relates to ownership restrictions. DGM (1997) show that Mexican firms' shares that are restricted to Mexican ownership sell at discounts compared with otherwise identical shares issued by the same firms that are owned by Mexican and non-Mexican investors. This finding is consistent with a differential valuation model whose premise is that foreign investors value securities differently from home-market investors because foreign investors have lower costs of capital or higher expected cash flows. Foreign investors may also have different demand functions because of different deadweight costs, as in Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) .
The last column of Table 5 We also examine how competitors disciplined our sample firms and influenced control. Our results indicate that, to varying degrees, control did shift from equity holders to debt holders for three of our five firms and that competition affected operating control and/or the value of control for our other two firms.
The three firms in which at least partial control shifted to debt holders include Grupo Sidek, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, and Consorcio G Grupo Dina. Before the peso crisis, Grupo Sidek was prominent in tourism and construction. When the peso crisis hit, Grupo Sidek became the first major Mexican firm to default when it failed to meet obligations on its $2.12 billion in debt in February 1995. In the debt restructuring that followed, the firm's founders and more than half its board lost their positions in the firm.
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo operated in the construction industry and was selected by the Mexican government to participate in the country's $10 billion highway construction plan. Again, however, the peso crisis led to default. By the end of 1995, interest on Grupo Mexicano's debt was 117.4% of sales. A government bailout provided Grupo Mexicano with relief, but that relief came in the form of discounted government bonds whose market value was less than half the $630 million Grupo Mexicano owed its creditors. Grupo Mexicano's burden was finally relieved when holders of dollar-denominated bonds swapped their debt for equity.
Consorcio G Grupo Dina encountered less difficulty than Grupo Sidek and Grupo Mexicano, in part, because of the collateral value of Motor Coach Industries International Inc (MCII), the U.S. firm Grupo Dina acquired when it issued its L ADRs in August 1994. The merger made Grupo Dina the largest manufacturer of intercity coaches in North America, but it also doubled the firm's dollardenominated debt. With the crisis, the debt burden sent Grupo Dina through a series of debt rating downgrades. Covenants on the merged firm's debt also restricted Grupo Dina from receiving dividends from MCII and prevented it from selling off Mexican subsidiaries to raise cash. In May 1996, however, Grupo Dina used its holdings in MCII as collateral to induce debt holders to exchange Eurobonds due in 1997 for new bonds due in 2002. Delayed interest payments on the new bonds and the removal of the restriction against selling assets bolstered Grupo Dina's liquidity and helped it avert default. In December 1998, Grupo Dina reincorporated in the U.S. and made MCII the parent company to lower the premium Grupo Dina paid on its debt and to allow MCII to funnel funds into Grupo Dina.
The foregoing paragraphs affirm that control did shift from equity holders to debt holders to varying degrees in Grupo Sidek, Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, and Consorcio G Grupo Dina. Though debt holders exerted less control over Grupo lusacell and Telefonos de Mexico, these firms were disciplined by their competitors.
In Table 2 are lower. Likewise, the relatively new entrant into Mexico's telecommunications market (Grupo lusacell) has a lower premium in Table 2 than does the dominant firm (Telefonos de Mexico). Thus, control premiums appear to decline as equity holders share control with debt holders and/or competitors.
However, like our other hypotheses, control sharing provides an incomplete explanation of the relative prices in Table 2 . Such sharing does not explain, for example, why Consorcio G Grupo Dina whose debt holders shared significant control with its equity holders has a large equity control premium, while a dominant firm like Telefonos de Mexico, whose debt holders shared little control with equity holders has a slight voting discount. Indeed, all our tests fail to explain why any superior voting ADR would be discounted relative to its inferior voting sibling. Nevertheless, this section does show that corporate control in our Mexican sample extends beyond the relatively simple voting control issues equity holders face.
V. Conclusion
Recent studies suggest that foreign firms that list their shares in the U.S. can circumvent their own weak legal systems by agreeing to disclose information that U.S. firms disclose and to abide by laws by which U.S. firms are governed. Though U.S. courts do not strictly enforce these agreements, positive and punitive market incentives may induce foreign firms to voluntarily adopt U.S. standards of "fair" treatment for minority shareholders.
To the extent such arguments are correct, the distribution of prices U.S. investors pay for superior vs. inferior voting ADRs issued by foreign firms should approximate the distribution of relative prices for dual-class shares issued by U.S. firms. However, we reject that hypothesis for our sample of Mexican sibling ADRs, whose median relative price shows a discount of 18%. We also reject the hypotheses that differences in cash flow rights, risk, and/or ownership structures or restrictions explain our findings. Differences in mean relative liquidity estimates explain part of what we observe, but time-series relationships between relative liquidity and relative prices are weak.
We also find that control issues for our sample are much more complex than a simple analysis of voting control suggests. Specifically, debt holders and competitors can discipline managers and influence control in ways that relative prices of superior and inferior voting ADRs may not capture. We suspect this conclusion holds more generally than in our small sample, but we leave it to other authors to examine the broader applicability of our finding.
